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Abstract
Background: Achieving universal coverage as an objective needs to confront the reality of multiple mechanisms,
with healthcare financing and provision occurring in both public and private settings. South Africa has both large
and mature public and private health systems offering useful insights into how they can be effectively harmonized
to optimise coverage. Private healthcare in South Africa has also gone through many phases and regulatory
regimes which, through careful review, can help identify potential policy frameworks that can optimise their ability
to deepen coverage in a manner that complements the basic coverage of public arrangements.
Research question: Using South Africa as a case study, this review examines whether private health systems are
susceptible to regulation and therefore able to support an extension and deepening of coverage when
complementing a pre-existing publicly funded and delivered health system?
Methods: The approach involves a review of different stages in the development of the South African private
health system and its response to policy changes. The focus is on the time-bound characteristics of the health
system and associated policy responses and opportunities. A distinction is consequently made between the early,
largely unregulated, phases of development and more mature phases with alternative regulatory regimes.
Results: The private health system in South Africa has played an important supplementary role in achieving
universal coverage throughout its history, but more especially in the post-Apartheid period. However, the quality of
this role has been erratic, influenced predominantly by policy vacillation.
The private system expanded rapidly during the 1980s mainly due to the pre-existence of a mature health
insurance system and a weakening public hospital system which could accommodate and facilitate an increased
demand for private hospital services. This growth served to expand commercial interest in health insurance, in the
form of regulated medical schemes, which until this point took the form of non-commercial occupational
(employer-based) schemes. During the 1980s government acquiesced to industry lobbies arguing for the
deregulation of health insurance from 1989, with an extreme deregulation occurring in 1994, evidently in
anticipation of the change of government associated with the democratic dispensation. Dramatic unintended
consequences followed, with substantial increases in provider and funder costs coinciding with uncontrolled
discrimination against poor health risks.
Against significant industry opposition, including legal challenges, partial re-regulation took effect from 2000 which
removed the discretion of schemes to discriminate against poor health risks. This included: the implementation of
a strong regulator of health insurance; the establishment of one allowable vehicle able to provide health insurance;
open enrolment, whereby schemes could not refuse membership applications; mandatory minimum benefit
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requirements; and a prohibition on setting contributions or premiums on the basis of health status. After a two-
year lag, dramatically reduced cost trends and contributions became evident. Aside from generally tighter
regulation across a range of fronts, this appears related to the need for schemes to compete more on the basis of
healthcare provider costs than demographic risk profiles. Despite an incomplete reform improved equitable
coverage and cost-containment was nevertheless achieved.
A more complete regulatory regime is consequently likely to deepen coverage by: further stabilising and even
decreasing costs; enhanced risk pooling; and access for low income groups. This would occur if South Africa:
improved the quality of free public services, thereby creating competitive constraints for medical schemes;
introduced risk-equalisation, increasing the pressure on schemes to compete on the cost and quality of coverage
rather than their risk profile; and through the establishment of improved price regulation.
Conclusions: The objective of universal coverage can be seen in two dimensions, horizontal extension and vertical
deepening. Private systems play an important role in deepening coverage by mobilising revenue from income
earners for health services over-and-above the horizontal extension role of public systems and related subsidies.
South Africa provides an example of how this natural deepening occurs whether regulated or unregulated. It also
demonstrates how poor regulation of mature private systems can severely undermine this role and diminish
achievements below attainable levels of social protection. The mature South African system has demonstrated its
sensitivity to regulatory design and responds rapidly to changes both positive and negative. When measures to
enhance risk pooling are introduced, coverage is expanded and becomes increasingly fair and sustainable. When
removed, however, the system becomes less stable and fair as costs rise and people with poor health status are
systematically excluded from cover. This susceptibility to regulation therefore presents an opportunity to
policymakers to achieve social protection objectives through the strategic management of markets rather than
exclusively through less responsive systems based on tax-funded direct provision. This is especially relevant as
private markets for healthcare are inevitable, with policy discretion reduced to a choice between functional or
dysfunctional regimes.
Definitions and terms used
Administrators: Refers to third-party administrators who
contract with medical schemes to perform all major
operational functions. This includes member manage-
ment, claims processing, and provider negotiations.
Medical schemes: The regulated health insurance vehi-
cle responsible for providing health insurance in South
Africa.
Non-price competition: Refers to hospital competition
with other hospitals for specialists to achieve patient
demand targets. This is to be distinguished from price
competition whereby hospital would compete with other
hospitals for patient volumes by offering volume-related
rice discounts.
Occupational scheme: Refers to an employer-sponsored
medical scheme which by law is now a “restricted mem-
bership scheme”. Historically these were the first coher-
ent health insurance arrangements in South Africa.
Open scheme: A type of medical scheme required by
law, from 2000, to accept any applicant for enrolment as
a member.
Restricted membership scheme: A type of medical
scheme able by law to limit membership to a specified
group associated with a specific employer, industry, pro-
fession or trade union. A scheme can only be permitted
to restrict membership where it will enhance risk pool-
ing and social solidarity.
Risk equalisation fund: A statutory mechanism pro-
posed but never implemented in South Africa to trans-
fer funds from schemes with a risk profile below the
market average to schemes with a risk profile above the
market average in order to achieve system-wide risk
pooling across multiple funds.
Scale of benefits: The tariff schedule used by medical
schemes to reimburse hospitals and health professionals.
Prior to 1994 this was statutory with providers charging
according to the schedule. From 1994 this became a refer-
ence price schedule with both schemes and providers able
to set their own reimbursement levels and tariffs.
Background
South Africa is an upper-middle-income country with a
population of roughly 50.6 million (2011 mid-year esti-
mate) [1] and a per capita Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of US$7,612 (2010). Overall population growth is
1.10% (2010-2011) which has declined from 1.33%
(2001-2002) [2]. The urban population reached 57% in
2001 and is increasing steadily [2]. It is probable that
the 2011 census will reveal a level well in excess of 60%.
Due largely to high structural unemployment rates,
which for a narrow definition of unemployment stood at
25% in the 3rd quarter of 2011 [3], income inequality is
high with an estimated gini coefficient for 2008 of 0.67-
0.68 [4]. This is to some degree mitigated by an extensive
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system of social assistance grants reaching upward of 15
million people by 2011, with expenditure equivalent to
3.6% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) [5].
South Africa’s burden of disease has deteriorated since
1994 due largely to HIV and AIDS and associated co-
morbidities such as tuberculosis (TB). In 2011 HIV and
AIDS prevalence is estimated at 10.6%, with life expec-
tancy for males and females at 54.9 and 59.1 respectively
[1]. However, maternal mortality ratios (MMRs) well
below expectations for country of South Africa’s level of
development, estimated at 300 out of 100,000 live births
with a confidence interval of 15 to 500 [6], suggest that
public sector clinical services are underperforming at
existing levels of investment [7]. Although 43.7% of all
maternal deaths involve AIDS, patient-related avoidable
factors were recorded in 46.5% of maternal deaths with
38.4% clearly avoidable [8]. Human Rights Watch inves-
tigations have also revealed that pregnant women are
abused by nurses in public facilities with inadequate for-
mal accountability mechanisms to protect patients [9].
South Africa has large public and private health systems,
with the former funded by general taxes for nine provin-
cial health departments and the national department, with
spending equivalent to 3.8% of GDP in 2010 [10], and the
latter through regulated voluntary not-for-profit private
health insurance arrangements, referred to as medical
schemes, equivalent to 3.4% of GDP in 2010 [11]. In 2010
there were 8.3 million medical scheme beneficiaries
equivalent to 16.6% of the total population. This number
is also growing continuously (figure 1). Overall health
expenditure is consequently around 8.8% of GDP includ-
ing out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure estimated at 1.5% of
GDP in 2009 [12].
Out-of-pocket expenditure, which is well within inter-
national norms, predominantly occurs in the top income
decile, although spending on private general practitioners
and specialists occurs across all income groups despite
access to free public services [13]. As public hospital ser-
vices are free for low-income groups while medical
schemes prioritise insurance for catastrophic expenses,
most OOP expenditure is for basic doctor-based primary
care services and some medicines.
Given this configuration of protection, South Africa
technically complies with the goal of universal coverage
as a comprehensive package of health services is available
on a pre-paid basis either through the public sector or
regulated health insurance (medical schemes). However,
poor policy development and implementation in the
post-apartheid period (from 1994) have exacerbated
rather than addressed historical institutional weaknesses
[7,9,30].Government critics argue that inadequate atten-
tion has been given to the correct mix of institutional
mechanisms to permit both the public and private sys-
tems to realise their full potential. Whereas much can be
said about the public system, this article focuses exclu-
sively on the potential role of the private system and its
contribution to extending and deepening universal
coverage.
Whereas the role of public subsidies, whether to fund
in-kind health services or to finance private provision, is
to maximise the horizontal extension of health services
to those without adequate income, privately funded
healthcare complements this role through the mobilisa-
tion of additional revenue. This funding can extend the
reach of government-subsidised services where income
earners use private services, or fund supplementary pro-
vision where coverage is highly rationed. South Africa’s
experience is more consistent with the former. However,
full advantage may not have been taken of the opportu-
nities presented over time. This review therefore makes
use of an historical analysis of the South African private
health system and its regulation to identify whether pri-
vate markets are susceptible to intervention such that
coverage is extended and deepened in a sustainable
manner.
Research question
Using South Africa as a case study, this review examines
whether private health systems are susceptible to regula-
tion and therefore able to support an extension and dee-
pening of coverage when complementing a pre-existing
publicly funded and delivered health system?
Methods
The approach involves a review of different stages in the
development of the South African private health system
and its response to policy changes. The focus is on the
time-bound characteristics of the health system and
associated policy responses and opportunities.
The review is divided broadly into two periods:
• From 1889 to 1999: where the system moves from
an immature non-commercial regime into a highly com-
mercialised insurance and provision in the final ten
years and where the latter period is heavily affected by a
major deregulation of health insurance; and
• From 2000 to 2010: where the mature system is sub-
jected to new regulatory interventions.
The periods and regulatory regimes are evaluated quali-
tatively with the relevant drivers of change identified,
focusing on their susceptibility to regulatory interventions.
The history of medical schemes to 1999
The emergence of occupational and industry schemes
What are today regulated in law as medical schemes had
their origins in various forms of occupational health
insurance beginning as early as 1889 with the De Beers
Consolidated Mines Limited Benefit Society Benefit
Society within the territory of what is now South Africa.
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Within fifteen years seven more funds of this nature
were established as the mining economy grew. Health
insurance arrangements preceded the establishment of
any government structure to supervise health care
which occurred for the first time only in 1919 following
the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1911,
which consolidated four separate countries following the
Anglo Boer war, and the influenza epidemic of 1919. By
1940 around forty eight occupational schemes existed.
Only from 1956 were medical schemes regulated for the
first time. Due to the rapid growth of South Africa’s
economy the number of schemes increased to 169 by
1960 with beneficiaries almost exclusively white. By
1990 the number of schemes peaked at around 230 with
some schemes serving more than one employer [15].
The first coherent regulatory framework was imple-
mented in 1967 which consolidated the legal definitions,
historically spread through various pieces of legislation,
and established registration and compliance structures.
During this period and up until around 1984 medical
schemes were non-competing occupational funds spon-
sored by employers or industries. They were supervised
as trust arrangements with boards representing the
interests of beneficiaries and employers. No profits were
permitted or surpluses distributed. Benefits and provider
tariffs were also regulated by way of a highly contested
scale of benefits prepared by the Representative Associa-
tion of Medical Schemes (RAMS) a private association
representing all medical schemes. Tension between
RAMS and healthcare providers resulted in ongoing
government vacillation between various models of col-
lectivised tariff setting [15] .
As medical schemes were predominantly non-competing
at this time, with risk pools framed around medium-to-
large employers and industries, benefit designs and the set-
ting of contributions complied largely with the principals
Figure 1 Medical scheme beneficiaries from 1990 to 2010 Data from Council for Medical Schemes’ Annual Reports [29]. The deregulation of
1994 resulted in the movement of beneficiaries from closed schemes to open schemes. The drop in beneficiary growth from 2000 to 2006
resulted from a stagnation of economic growth. From 2006 most beneficiary growth results from the introduction of the Government
Employee’s Medical Scheme (GEMS), with some growth also resulting from increased economic growth. The introduction of GEMS, which is a
closed scheme, also resulted in a switch away from open commercial schemes.
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of social solidarity. Contributions were differentiated on the
basis of income, with higher income groups paying more.
Differentiation on the basis of health status was prohibited
by law. Schemes also needed to comply with a system of
mandatory minimum benefits based on the scale of bene-
fits, which specified the proportion of reimbursement
required of a consultation, procedure, or tariff. From 1980
schemes were required to pay in full any invoice submitted
directly by registered medical practitioners compliant with
the scale of benefits. Where an invoice exceeded the scale
of benefits schemes reimbursed the member only after
they had initially settled the account. This mechanism
served as an incentive for healthcare service providers to
comply with the scale of benefits as members could be
slow and irregular in settling accounts [15].
Over this period medical schemes primarily reim-
bursed the expenses of private health professionals and
hospital services located in the public sector. Access to
public hospitals was, and still is, subject to a means test
affecting everyone over the tax threshold and quite a
few below [15]. For anyone over the tax threshold a
medical scheme was therefore essential to avoid cata-
strophic health expenses associated with private specia-
list and public hospital services.
To encourage employers to provide medical scheme
coverage a tax subsidy was available where an employer
paid the medical scheme contribution. This has since
been altered to an allowable deduction in the hands of an
employee to cater for the self-employed. All low-income
groups have always had access to a free public health ser-
vice which, apart from a few exceptions, was formally
segregated on the basis of race from 1948. Interestingly,
due to this configuration white taxpayers did not have
free access to public services, although they did have a
portion of their contribution indirectly subsidised
through the tax rebate.
The emergence of private hospitals
International sanctions, together with the financing of
wars in Angola and Mozambique, reduced South Afri-
ca’s economic growth rate from 1982 with a negative
impact on government finances. Roughly from that per-
iod the tax-based funding of public health services
began to worsen. This coincided with the emergence of
private hospitals owned largely by medical specialists
already working in the public sector. Many specialists
working part-time in the private sector during the 1980s
were also in a position to divert medical scheme covered
patients into their private practices and associated pri-
vate hospital services. By the end of the 1980s the
decline in the quality of public hospitals together with
the financial incentives of private specialists had helped
the rapid creation of a fairly substantial private doctor-
owned hospital system.
From 1986 to 1989 private hospitals increased from 65
(6,125 beds or 5% of the total) to 101 (10,908 beds or 9%
of the total). By 2010 private hospitals had increased to
216 with 31,067 beds or 26% of the total. The number of
public hospital beds have however always far exceeded
the private sector with 117 842 (91% of all beds) available
in 1986. They have however declined to 88 920 beds (or
74% of the total) by 2010. The decline in the number of
public sector beds was consequently matched by
increased beds in the private sector (Table 1).
The shift of treatment into private hospitals dramati-
cally increased the cost of medical schemes as public
hospitals did not charge full cost recovery (implicitly
subsidising medical scheme members) and had no
incentives to over-service. Private hospitals however
priced for both cost-recovery and profit, and benefited
from the incentives of private specialists to over-service.
The resulting cost changes during the 1980s began to
alter the market dynamics of medical schemes. They
also increased the turnover and complexity of funders,
incentivising increased commercial interest in the provi-
sion of health insurance.
The emergence of commercial competing open schemes
During the 1980s medical scheme administrators, who
contracted with occupational medical schemes to manage
their operations, developed sufficient expertise in health
insurance to expand into commercial insurance models
independent of employers. Coverage was offered to multi-
ple employers reflecting a natural evolution of the system.
However, they were constrained by the occupational-
scheme orientation of the legislative framework. Commer-
cial schemes consequently lobbied for the ability to design
contribution tables for different employers and even indi-
viduals, while keeping benefit arrangements common. For
this to happen the strict legislative regime, which limited
the manner in which contributions could be set, came
under pressure from the commercial arm of medical
schemes, the third-party administrators contracted to
schemes to perform their operational functions. Proposals
to liberalise the health insurance market surfaced from
Table 1 Private and public hospitals and bed estimates
from 1976 to 2010
Year Private Public
Hospitals Beds Hospitals Beds
1976 251 2 3461
1986 651 6 1252 117 8423
1989 1011 10 9361
19984 162 20 908 343 107 634
20105 216 31 067 410 88 920
1 Hospital Association of South Africa [32], 2 Estimated using the bed to
hospital ratio for 1976 from the other data in the table, 3Estimated from
Zwaranstein et al [33], 4Health Systems Trust [34], 5Health Systems Trust [35].
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1984, couched in the pro-market language prevalent at the
time, which argued that this would make medical schemes
more affordable. The objectives underpinning the amend-
ments to the Medical Schemes Act of 1967 stressed these
“positive” intentions: “To have a medical scheme the
ordinary person will be able to afford”; and “To prevent
the socialisation of medicine” [15]. This led to the first sig-
nificant deregulation of health insurance in South Africa.
Medical scheme deregulation – the period from 1989 to
1999
In accepting the “pro-market” arguments, the ability to
set premiums on the basis of the risk of claiming were
implemented by government in 1989. From this period
contributions could be set on the grounds of the num-
ber of dependents, income, age, geographic area, claims
experience, extent of cover provided, period of member-
ship, and the size of the participating group [15].
This remarkable deregulation however was not suffi-
cient to permit commercial or open medical schemes
(which serve multiple employers and sometimes indivi-
duals) to emerge. The requirement to comply with man-
datory minimum benefits determined in relation to the
scale of benefits constrained their ability to undercut the
occupational schemes. Risk rating was not enough.
Industry lobbies successfully influenced the govern-
ment to implement a material further deregulation from
1 January 1994, just prior to the new democratic dispen-
sation that would bring in a new government from May
1994. This removed the requirement for mandatory
minimum benefits [15]. In 1993 government also made
membership of a medical scheme voluntary for govern-
ment employees, allowing them to choose their own
open scheme. The former mandatory government-spon-
sored schemes, of which there were four, were conse-
quently converted into open commercial schemes.
Three other public sector medical schemes remained
closed and mandatory: the police force scheme; the par-
liamentary scheme which includes all judges; and the
scheme for correctional services (prisons) staff.
The changes rapidly transformed the system of medical
schemes with inter alia.: a substantial shift away from
occupational schemes into open commercial schemes
(from 50% of all beneficiaries in 1994 to over 70% by
1999) (figure 1); the use of illegal commissions to incenti-
vise employers to close their occupational schemes and
shift to open schemes [16]; and the explicit discrimina-
tion against older and sicker members within open com-
peting medical schemes [15].
Price competition between commercial medical schemes
occurred on the basis of risk-selection (the selection of
beneficiaries on the basis of health status) and risk-rating
(the pricing of contributions on the basis of health status).
Contributions paid through open schemes were flat-rate
(apart from variations due to health status) and eliminated
the income cross-subsidies that characterised occupational
schemes. Social solidarity principles inherent within medi-
cal schemes were consequently wiped out in a mere five
years.
Although medical schemes could not lawfully distribute
profits, open commercial medical schemes, dominated by
their administration companies, began introducing rein-
surance contracts to siphon off underwriting surpluses
into entities, that colluded with administrators or were
owned by them, and to pay brokers [17]. Another
mechanism to circumvent the laws prohibiting the distri-
bution of profits and the funding of brokers involved the
commission-based co-selling of short- and long-term (for
profit) health insurance products packaged together with
medical schemes in collusion with the administrators.
This intensified the commercial incentives to discrimi-
nate against people and groups with a higher risk of
claiming benefits.
Risk-based scheme competition and costs
Contradicting the apparent rationale for deregulation,
that price competition through risk rating (and selec-
tion) will bring down prices and increase membership,
the opposite occurred. The period from 1994 saw a
trend break in medical scheme per capita contribution
increases (figure 2). Non-health care expenditure
(administration expenses and net reinsurance losses) by
medical schemes also demonstrate a break in trend
from 1994 [15]. Importantly, new expenses over-and-
above basic administration suddenly made their appear-
ance from 1994.
Over this period regulation involved little more than
the registration of medical schemes and some low-key
prudential supervision. The regulator itself was a low-
level official in the National Department of Health with
a staff of seven, none of whom were professionally qua-
lified [18]. Although a Council existed to supervise the
regulator, the majority of appointments were of indivi-
duals working directly within medical schemes or medi-
cal scheme administrators. It could be argued that the
market was essentially self-regulated at this stage.
Dramatic contribution increases from 1994 to 1999
consequently resulted from two sources: trend changes
in the cost of healthcare services; and trend changes in
non-health costs. Whereas the latter is explained by the
latitude given to medical schemes and their administra-
tors to profit from schemes, the former was driven largely
by the nature of scheme price competition. As schemes
could compete by passing risk onto members and benefi-
ciaries (through risk-selection and risk-rating) they had
no incentive to control underlying medical expenses. The
inelastic nature of demand for medical scheme coverage
furthermore meant that cost increases did not result in
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membership declines. Competing medical schemes there-
fore faced no market-related penalties for passing cost
increases on to contributors, provided they kept their
increases in line with those of other schemes. The pricing
strategies therefore focused exclusively on gaining market
share from occupational schemes rather than competi-
tion amongst commercial schemes, further dulling incen-
tives to be cost-efficient.
The incentive-driven behavioural change of schemes
affected the behaviour of medical service providers dur-
ing this period as schemes had little interest in serious
cost containment. Poor regulation of specialists from a
competition perspective allowed successful horizontal
collusion (between specialists) to foreclose early
attempts by schemes in 1997 to introduce forms of
selective contracting [19]. Such scheme initiatives could
have influenced subsequent hospital and specialist cost
trends.
Whereas doctor-owned hospitals emerged during the
1980s, corporate ownership of hospitals became a major
trend only during the 1990s, with significant and rapid
market consolidation into three corporate groups by
1999, a period of roughly ten years. Although the hospi-
tal market was technically not an oligopoly in 1999, it
was a mere two years thereafter [16]. From 1994 only
three hospital groups bought independent hospitals. At
some point during the early 1990s a market power
threshold was crossed which accelerated the consolida-
tion by the three groups. (Figures 2 and 3).
This market power was initially directed at indepen-
dent hospitals who were vulnerable to non-price compe-
tition against the more revenue secure hospital groups.
Their increasing and stable surpluses were used to chase
demand by competing for specialists rather than com-
peting for patient volumes (demand) though price dis-
counts. Specialists, who operate independently of
Figure 2 Private hospital and other medical schemes claims costs per person per annum, South African Rands (2010 prices) Data from
Council for Medical Schemes’ Annual Reports [29]. Medical scheme claims costs increased more steeply during the 1990s than during the post-
reform period which was implemented from 2000. Private hospital costs initially increased more steeply during the post reform phase after the
market became concentrated from 2000. Private hospitals returned to the pre-2000 trend in 2004 but at a structurally higher cost.
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hospitals in the private sector (they are not employed by
hospitals), are actively attracted to hospital groups by
capital investments in specialised medical equipment
and practice management support. As certain hospital
groups achieved sustainable revenue flows through the
predictable demand provided by the specialist referrals,
they were better positioned than independent hospitals
to invest in the capital equipment required to attract
more specialists. As independent hospitals lost their
ability to retain specialists, demand for their services
declined, exposing them to inevitable takeover by any
one of the cash flush large hospital groups. As a result
whereas in 1998 44.7% of private hospital beds were still
in independent hands, by 2002 only 30.2% remained. By
2006 this had dropped to 16.2% (figure 3) [16].
Once the hospital consolidation passed an important
concentration threshold in 1999, their market power,
initially directed against independent hospitals (competi-
tors), could now be directed against medical schemes
who became price takers. Thus although a trend break
in rising private hospital costs occurs only from 2000,
the conditions for this trend break were established dur-
ing the 1990s. (Figures 2 and 3).
Scheme demographics
The demographic make-up of medical schemes also
became more inclusive from the mid-1980s to 1999 with
a surging black middle class taking up coverage. Whereas
in 1984 only 14.8% of scheme beneficiaries were black
[20], by 1995 it improved significantly to 37.6% with
whites at 48.6% [21]. These positive trends continued
through 2000, with black beneficiaries substantially
exceeding whites by 2007 with proportions at 42.8% and
39.8% respectively. By 2010 black beneficiaries consti-
tuted nearly half of all beneficiaries at 46.3% (3.8 million
beneficiaries) with whites now well below at 35.7% (3
million beneficiaries) [22]. The differential improvement
in black membership from 1995 is attributable to
Figure 3 Private hospital changes in market share from 1996 to 2006 for the three main hospital groups: Life Health, Netcare, and
Medi-clinic Data from Council for Medical Schemes [16] From 2000 the market for private hospital acute beds was concentrated in the hands
of only three hospital groups.
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growing black middle class. It is likely that by 2012 black
beneficiaries will exceed 50% of the total.
Medical scheme re-regulation – the period from
2000
Policy positions
During the 1990s plans were made to reintroduce a reg-
ulatory regime framed around a preferred private health
insurance entity that had evolved to date, the medical
scheme. Parallel insurance operating through more con-
ventional insurance regimes were regarded as unregula-
table as they had no standard institutional structure or
regulatory regime. Short- and long-term insurance
arrangements were also subject to much lighter regula-
tory supervision through the Financial Service Board
reporting to the Minister of Finance.
However, a return to the pre-1994 framework could
no longer accommodate the altered and rapidly evolving
nature of the private health system. The existence of
competing commercial medical schemes, together with a
supportive broker system, was now an unavoidable rea-
lity. The continuous decline in occupational schemes,
particularly the smaller ones, was now systemic. Cost
containment had also become an evident problem, with
non-health costs also reaching alarming levels [16].
The new regulatory model now needed to reconstitute
social solidarity that also generated incentives to manage
costs. A policy framework tabled in 1995 talked to new
measures (that had never existed before) as well as some
that had been removed in 1989 and 1994 including: com-
munity rating (contributions that could not be differen-
tiated on the basis of health status); open enrolment,
whereby open commercial medical schemes would not
be able to deny membership to applicants (removing
their ability to risk-select); mandatory minimum benefits
with an emphasis on catastrophic health expenses; inter-
scheme risk-equalisation, which sought to affect inter-
scheme financial transfers to ensure that all schemes
faced the same prospective demographic risk profile; and
mandatory membership to deal with anti-selection
(where people only take up cover when needing health
care). The proposed framework also incorporated recom-
mendations for income-based cross-subsidies, to be
achieved through a risk-equalisation mechanism, and
mandatory participation for income earners [23].
What was eventually implemented?
In the face of significant industry opposition, which
included a failed legal challenge to stop the legislation, a
less comprehensive framework than originally proposed
was eventually legislated in 1998, taking effect from
2000. Important provisions included the establishment
of an independent regulator separate from government;
open enrolment; community rating; minimum solvency
requirements; the accreditation of brokers and the regu-
lation of their commissions; and mandatory minimum
benefits focusing on catastrophic medical expenses.
However, the framework did not mandate membership
and nor did it introduce risk-equalisation. To mitigate
the inevitable anti-selection within a voluntary environ-
ment, a system of waiting periods and late-joiner penal-
ties were introduced. In both instances the penalty
framework incorporated rewards for continuity of mem-
bership within the system of medical schemes. All sig-
nificant barriers to free movement between schemes was
removed.
The recommendations regarding mandatory member-
ship and risk-equalisation were taken up in a subsequent
committee of inquiry which concluded its work in 2002
but was never implemented [24].
The impact of re-regulation
Even the partial framework, which really started impact-
ing after 2001, systematically altered important trends.
From 2002 non-health real per capita expenditure lar-
gely flattened with only a 4.6% real increase over the
entire period to 2010. Demonstrating the extent of the
behavioural change, in the two years leading to 2002 the
annual real per capita increases were 28.2% and 21.8%
respectively [11].
Contribution increases also flattened from 2002 with a
19.3% real per capita increase over the entire period to
2010 [11]. However, a more definitive trend break
occurred after 2004 with the increase over the whole per-
iod to 2010 only 4.7%. This can largely be attributed to the
flattening of claims cost increases from 2004 (figure 2),
and schemes achieving their new statutory solvency levels
by 2005 (these had to be phased in from 2001 for a period
of five years). Regulatory action to remove all inappropri-
ate reinsurance agreements also took effect from 2004.
The altered year-on-year trends in medical costs,
although remaining structurally high, resulted from a
number of measures that came to a head during 2004.
This included new price legislation for medicines, in
place from August 2004, which inter alia introduced a
single-exit pricing mechanism. This together with other
statutory provisions prohibited the “discounting” of med-
icines, effectively outlawing a number of cost-inducing
kick-back arrangements operating between private hospi-
tals and medicine manufacturers as well as doctors and
medicine manufacturers [16]. Per capita medicine costs
subsequently declined for three consecutive years and
remaining largely flat thereafter.
Several measures aimed at medical schemes also
altered their incentives and capability to manage costs
from 2001. As open commercial schemes could no longer
compete using risk-rated contributions or risk-selection,
they had to compete on healthcare costs. In the case of
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medicines the mandatory minimum benefits for chronic
conditions, which took effect from 2004, incentivised
immediate efficiencies through scheme-developed clinical
protocols and medicine formularies.
Generalised improvements in administration from
1999, which saw electronic claims processing introduced
universally, also improved the capacity to manage costs.
This capability was further enhanced from 2005 with a
statutory requirement placed on healthcare providers to
supply clinical codes together with invoices.
Scheme consolidation
The regulatory framework (through new minimum mem-
bership requirements), together with commercial incen-
tives already prevalent in the 1990s, saw schemes
consolidate, with over 220 schemes in 1998 reducing to
only 100 by 2010. The consolidation was also given a
boost from 2005 with the introduction of the Government
Employees Medical Scheme (GEMS) reversing the 1993
decision liberalising medical cover for government
employees with significant implications for the market. As
there are approximately 1.3 million general government
employees, a maximum potential membership exists,
when dependents are included, of around 3 million.
GEMS is presently at around half this number and
remains the fastest growing scheme in the country.
Roughly coinciding with this period one commercial
open scheme, Discovery Health Medical Scheme, also
grew rapidly from around 250,000 beneficiaries at the
beginning of 2000 to approximately 2.1 million benefici-
aries by 2010. By 2010 just two medical schemes therefore
covered 41% of all beneficiaries (3.4 million out of 8.3 mil-
lion). Although the consolidation holds out some possibi-
lity of better contracting with providers, it also reduces
market penalties for over-priced scheme contributions.
The consolidation of membership into a few national
schemes reflects an apparent systemic trend resulting
from the emergence of multi-employer commercial
schemes in the 1980s.
Differential pricing by group size
Open enrolment, which required that all open schemes
accept all applicants, eliminated contribution-based price
discrimination based on the size of group joining an open
scheme. Prior to 2000 open schemes would, at their dis-
cretion, differentiate contributions on the basis of group
size, with individuals and smaller groups paying more than
larger groups. This practice prejudices small employers
and the self-employed. The introduction of open enrol-
ment together with community rated contributions (where
the community is a plan or option offered by a scheme)
eliminated this differential pricing according to group size
without undermining financial sustainability, which has
important implications for enhanced social solidarity.
Gaps in medical scheme regulation and its
consequences
Risk pooling
The legislative framework of 1998 and implemented
from 2000 enhanced the social protection possible
through a voluntary (predominantly) competing health
insurance environment, but retained significant and
important gaps.
The removal of discrimination on the basis of health sta-
tus in the absence of inter-scheme risk-equalisation
exposes competing health insurers to their demographic
risk profile which they cannot control. Competing health
insurers with poor risk profiles consequently need to be
priced in excess of those with good risk profiles regardless
of how efficiently they manage claims costs. This drives
younger and healthier beneficiaries to schemes with better
risk profiles, giving rise to a price-related death spiral and
scheme failure. Given open enrolment, beneficiaries
migrate to surviving schemes resulting in systemic scheme
consolidation.
Although unable to explicitly introduce risk-rated con-
tributions, schemes have been able to manage this contin-
gency by offering multiple plans, specified in law as
options, with different levels of benefit. The limited range
of mandatory minimum benefits (amounting to around
35% of a comprehensive package) allowed schemes to
achieve milder forms of risk-rating by leveraging off the
anti-selective conduct of younger and healthier families
and groups who self-select benefit packages that reflect
their risk profile. Options offering only catastrophic health
cover therefore predominantly attract younger and heal-
thier groups, while comprehensive benefit options attract
older and sicker groups. As each option (or benefit plan)
is priced separately, cross-subsidies between options
within the same scheme can be set at the discretion of the
scheme, allowing contribution rates to vary between
options on two factors: the risk of claiming; and benefit
levels. Despite community rating, therefore, comprehen-
sive options implicitly include a risk-related loading, while
catastrophic cover options benefit from a risk-related
discount.
The risk-sifting options designs remove scheme incen-
tives to aggressively risk-select in exchange for an implicit
contribution penalty for those choosing comprehensive
options. However, the penalty is more subdued than
occurred during the deregulations of 1989 and 1994 for a
number of market-related reasons. Schemes have to bal-
ance two factors in setting contributions: the average risk of
claiming and income-based preferences. In a flat-rate con-
tribution environment (i.e. no income differentiation), as
incomes rise contribution rates decline as a proportion of
income. Higher income groups, regardless of health status,
prefer and can consequently afford more comprehensive
benefits. Comprehensive options consequently attract
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multiple risk groups, even if there are disproportionately
more poor risks.
Significant market pressure consequently exists to
keep the better risk groups in the comprehensive
options as they stabilise the pricing for their lucrative
corporate clients who demand comprehensive coverage.
Virtually all open schemes therefore deliberately over-
price their low-cover options to cross-subsidise their
comprehensive options.
Without risk-equalisation, however, government cannot
easily expand the package of mandatory minimum benefits
as this would compel schemes to consolidate options and
destabilise the pricing of schemes with older and sicker
demographic profiles. Scheme consolidation would also
accelerate through the death spiral mentioned earlier, with
a market equilibrium reached only when all the remaining
schemes are broadly similar in demographic profile, which
is most likely after significant consolidation. Although
technically the expanded package with and without risk-
equalisation at the new equilibrium point could be
regarded as equivalent from an equity perspective, the
market dynamics should be different. The extent of
scheme consolidation likely in the without risk-equalisa-
tion scenario, while increasing the capability to manage
provider costs, may reduce competition to such an extent
that medical scheme contribution increases would have to
be regulated.
Cost containment
Although risk-equalisation would have incentivised
schemes to manage healthcare provider costs more effec-
tively (by forcing them to compete on price rather than
risk), a degree of government involvement in the man-
agement of cost is inevitable due to the market power of
private providers. Although cost increases have stabilised
during the 2000s, the market power of hospitals and spe-
cialists in particular are able to apply systemic upward
pressure for some time to come. Other health providers
and medicines are unlikely to impact on cost as the for-
mer have limited market power and the latter are subject
to increasing price regulation.
As three hospital groups dominate the private health
system, schemes presently acquiesce to their price
demands or face the threat of having their members bal-
ance-billed (required to pay the difference between what
the scheme pays and hospital charges). As hospital cover-
age is the essential driver of demand for medical scheme
coverage, short payments on catastrophic cover will
result in members quickly switching their scheme (facili-
tated by open enrolment and brokers) to one willing to
capitulate to the hospital groups. As schemes are prohib-
ited from colluding amongst themselves by competition
legislation, a collective stand against a threat to balance
bill is not possible. Threats to cherry pick hospitals into
networks are also easily repelled as the market for such
contracts are small, and kept that way by the hospital
groups. The hospital groups express their market power
by preventing the emergence of price competition in the
market for hospital services, thereby giving them near
complete control over their revenue flows, constrained
only by the number of specialists [16].
Although specialists are essential to the development of
a selective contracting market for both their own and hos-
pital services, were they to begin to enter in to such
arrangements the hospital groups are likely to retaliate
through the denial of hospital privileges. Thus although
specialists have market power in relation to schemes, their
power over the concentrated hospital system is weak. Hos-
pital groups consequently compete, but not on price. They
compete for specialists. This non-price competition drives
costs up and not down, and constitutes a form of market
failure quite unique to health markets.
A strategy that would have gone a long way toward bal-
ancing the market, recommended by the Taylor Commit-
tee of Inquiry in 2002 but never implemented, was to
boost the autonomy and capability of public hospitals
and to permit them to compete with private hospitals
and specialists for the patronage of medical schemes.
Unfortunately, over the past fifteen years public hospitals
have deteriorated. The general low regard for public hos-
pitals consequently makes them unattractive for medical
scheme members and removes the leverage schemes
could otherwise exercise over private hospitals.
Managing non-price competition
Resolving price determination within the non-price com-
petition market for hospitals and specialists would go a
long way toward cost management within medical
schemes. Proposals in this regard [25] involve the estab-
lishment of an independent (both of government and the
private sector) price regulator to coordinate centralised
negotiations between medical schemes, final consumers of
healthcare, and all providers. The resulting prices and tar-
iffs would apply exclusively to the non-price competition
market. Any market participants willing to negotiate
agreements on a selective contract basis (between schemes
and non-colluding healthcare providers and suppliers)
would be permitted to do so provided they complied with
existing competition laws.
The proposed centralised negotiations would therefore
balance out market power differences between funders,
consumers and healthcare service providers resulting in
more balanced pricing. Irresolvable disputes in the nego-
tiations would be managed by automatic referral to an
independent arbitrator who would decide which com-
peting bid to accept. The arbitrator would not be free to
make a separate proposal. The final decision by the arbi-
trator would be required to take account of factual
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motivations provided by the relevant parties to the
initial negotiations. The overall process would generate
price transparency and reasonableness in the bidding
process. It would also systematically remove the abuse
of market power as a basis for price setting. Importantly
prices remain determined by way of negotiation between
the principals rather than by government (i.e. an admi-
nistered price) with government’s role to design a fair
process for the negotiations [25].
The relationship between regulated medical
schemes and the public sector
The performance of the public sector has deteriorated
considerably over the past fifteen years, for reasons unre-
lated to resourcing [7], although some have argued on
the basis of crude per capita expenditure differentials
between medical schemes and the public system are to
blame [26]. However, health workforce differentials
between the public and private sectors, apart from spe-
cialists, do not reflect an equity problem or a resourcing
problem when the official registration data is corrected
for errors [27-29]. Per capita expenditure differentials
only suggest different cost-efficiencies and preferences
between the two sectors and no plausible relationship to
public health system outcomes is detectible.
Both the 1995 and 2002 committees of inquiry dealing
with health reform took the view that the relationship
between the non-contributory and contributory regimes
of the health system should be harmonized, recognising
that both offered strong mechanisms which together
could efficiently achieve universal coverage. However, for
the complete system to be in place specific reforms in
both the public and private sectors are required. The for-
mer requires a better structuring of its institutions to
enhance accountability and decision-making, while the
latter inter alia requires risk-equalisation and cost man-
agement. It was furthermore proposed that the public
and private sector providers need to be available for con-
tracting by both the public sector and medical schemes.
However, although medical schemes have the capability
to purchase public sector services, the public sector is
unable to manage complex contractual arrangements or
meet requirements regarding quality.
Conclusions
The South African health system provides an important
case study for developing countries on mixed models for
the expansion and deepening of coverage. Although it is
an upper-middle-income country its experiences are
nevertheless relevant to a much wider category of country
contexts. Both the successes and failures are instructive.
Whereas industrialised (high-income) countries have the
option of achieving far deeper universal coverage via
predominantly universal mechanisms and entitlements,
developing countries need to confront the reality of multi-
ple financing and service-delivery mechanisms. Private
markets will also emerge regardless of their desirability.
Explicitly designed mixed system models are able to com-
bine publicly provided and subsidised services together
with regulated insurance markets to effectively achieve
multiple social and public goals, while leveraging off pri-
vate incentives and preferences. However, achieving social
protection objectives through private markets requires
strong regulators and an understanding of market
dynamics that are not universally well understood or
documented.
The objective of universal coverage can be seen in two
dimensions, horizontal extension and vertical deepening.
Private systems play an important role in deepening cover-
age by mobilising revenue from income earners for health
services over-and-above the horizontal extension role of
public systems and related subsidies. South Africa provides
an example of how this natural deepening occurs whether
regulated or unregulated. It also demonstrates how poor
regulation of mature private systems can severely under-
mine this role and diminish achievements below attainable
levels of social protection.
The mature South African system has demonstrated
its sensitivity to regulatory design and responds rapidly
to changes both positive and negative. When measures
to enhance risk pooling are introduced, coverage is
expanded and becomes increasingly fair and sustainable.
When removed, however, the system becomes less
stable and fair as costs rise and people with poor health
status are systematically excluded from cover. This sus-
ceptibility to regulation therefore presents an opportu-
nity to policymakers to achieve social protection
objectives through the strategic management of markets
rather than exclusively through less responsive systems
based on tax-funded direct provision.
As private markets will emerge regardless of government
policy, any failure to effectively regulate, encouraged by
the belief that commercialised health markets are inher-
ently in opposition to the public interest, will prove coun-
terproductive as cost spirals occur and coverage fails to
deepen. Understanding the specific requirements for a
well-regulated private health system within developing
country contexts therefore needs to become better under-
stood if the objectives of universal coverage are to be ade-
quately met in the next two decades. This is especially
relevant for those developing countries experiencing rapid
economic growth where burgeoning unregulated private
health systems are likely to emerge. This should however
go hand in hand with the development of a consensus on
the essential ingredients for a well-functioning general tax
funded publicly provided or funded health service.
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